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Abstract 
Liberalisation transforms market structures through the responses of incumbent firms and 
entrants to freedom of choice.  As market shares turn more volatile, the agility of small and large 
firms will determine changes in market structure. We analyse these processes for Indian 
manufacturing industries over the 18-year period from 1980, spanning the liberalisation of 1985 
and more comprehensive reforms of 1991, using a data set of large and medium firms in 83 
industries. We find that large changes in turbulence in market shares, and in the way firm growth 
was related to size tended to offset one another, producing deceptively little change in market 
structure itself. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper analyses changes in market structure in the context of significant structural and 
policy shifts. Much of the analysis of market structure in Western market economies 
concentrates on relatively mature, stable industries. Patterns of change in such industries are 
likely to be very different from those in dynamic and fast growing industries in transitional 
economies. The paper makes two key contributions to the literature. First, it provides a novel 
decomposition of market structure changes into two components – the changes caused by the 
mobility of firms in each industry across the size ranking and the changes that are related to the 
size of the firms. This extends earlier decompositions (Davies and Geroski, 1997) by pinning 
down the joint evolution of market share turbulence and size-related growth in the context of a 
full distribution measure of concentration – the Hirschman Herfindahl Index. Secondly, the 
application of this analysis is particularly illuminating in the context of a developing, transitional 
economy.  
 
A key intended result of greater freedom conferred upon firms to choose competition strategies 
is readier market selection - whereby efficient firms enter and grow by investing to enhance 
capabilities, productivity and quality, while less efficient firms contract and exit. New 
investments, depending on their magnitude and effectiveness, should lead to changes in the 
configuration of market shares. There may be a "noisy" flurry of activity that follows 
liberalisation, but deeper patterns of adjustment, in terms of exit or contraction of the inefficient 
and entry and growth of the efficient, should win through as the dust settles. However, 
liberalisation will also mean fiercer battles for market shares, and one should expect less stability 
in the configuration of market shares.  
 
Which types of firms respond to the new found freedom in terms of growth? The best 
practice technology in each industry will determine whether they are small firms or large. In 
some industries, small firms hitherto sheltering behind regulations may turn out to be the 
more agile and successful in gaining market shares. In others, particularly those where 
economies of scale derive from the critical nature of advertising and R&D, unwinding 
regulations may permit large firms to outrun small. Growth responses will also depend on the 
scope of liberalisation. Limited domestic liberalisation that frees domestic firms, shielding 
them from international competition could favour larger domestic firms. Liberalisation of 
trade and foreign investment, subjecting domestic firms to international competition may be 
harsher on the largest firms if they do not restructure rapidly. As competition increases 
sharply, market shares may grow volatile and gainers of market shares will be less able to 
maintain them as a matter of course.  
 
At the heart of our analysis is a reconciliation of divergent aspects in market structure 
dynamics. ‘… Changes in concentration occur slowly with high or low levels of 
concentration persisting for relatively long periods of time. On the other hand, …[it is 
common to find]… large changes of shares which sometimes occur over short periods of time 
among the group of leading firms.’’ (Davies and Geroski, 1997, p.383). The intuition is that 
when market shares of firms change, some of the changes offset each other in the calculation 
of concentration. This may happen, for example, if firm A  and firm B trade places in the 
share rankings even though their absolute market shares do not change. This will leave the 
concentration ratio unchanged in spite of there being significant mobility within the industry. 
Which aspect captures the true picture of competitive rivalry (Davies and Geroski, 1997)?
1
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Liberalisation episodes, when competitive rivalry increased, are a suitable context to revisit 
this question. Using data from an interesting period, we use a simple decomposition 
framework to examine how changes in market concentration related, on the one hand, to 
market share churning and, on the other, to the degree to which large (or small) firms gained 
market shares systematically. We examine these distinct component elements of market 
structure changes in the context of two episodes of reforms in India. The first, dated at 1985-
86, involved limited domestic deregulation. In contrast, the reforms of 1991 were far reaching 
and encompassed substantial opening up to the international economy. We look at the growth 
responses of medium and large firms in a set of 83 manufacturing industries (defined at the 
SIC 3 digit level) over a period 1980 to 1998, and examine the impact of the very different 
types of shocks to the business environment in 1985 and 1991.  
 
By way of background, the main features of the two phases of liberalisation are outlined in the 
next section. In section 3, we set out a framework for our analysis and review issues in market 
structure dynamics. Section 4 describes the data and provides a preliminary characterisation of 
the variables of interest. Section 5 sets out our econometric model that is estimated in a panel 
framework.  The results are discussed in section 6, with an assessment of the dynamics of the 
components of market structure change, in relation to each other and to their total.  Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1 Liberalisation in India: 1985 and 1991  
 
Till the mid 1980s India followed a strategy of planned economic development based on import 
substitution. The 1951 Industrial Development Regulation Act had set out the basic cast and 
machinery of industrial policy. This involved a comprehensive regulation of the direction and 
volume of investment through licenses, a large public sector, and foreign exchange controls. 
Planned import substitution tilted investment flows initially towards heavy and capital goods 
industries and later towards chemicals, petroleum and durable consumer goods. It is now 
universally accepted that this highly regulated and protectionist regime spawned a sluggish and 
high cost manufacturing system that was also dynamically inefficient (Bhagwati and Desai, 
1970; Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1975; Ahluwalia, 1985). 
 
In 1985, the Rajiv Gandhi administration (1984-1991) crystallised the logic for reducing the 
stranglehold of regulation that had been gathering strength over time, into the first, though 
modest, effort to rejuvenate the industrial system in over forty years. These reforms, collectively 
termed the New Economic Plan, but more accurately characterised as liberalisation by stealth, 
eased entry and expansion of incumbent firms by de-licensing capacity expansion for many 
classes of firms: firms with assets below a moderate threshold; those located in "backward" 
areas; firms in scale-critical industries, and firms that were "modernising". Modernisation was 
encouraged through relaxing controls on import of capital equipment and technical know-how. 
Licenses were "broadbanded" to allow enterprises to adjust their product mixes more easily to 
changing market conditions. There was some relaxation of the restrictions on “monopoly 
houses”, if their expansion were in “priority industries”. (Economic Survey, 1985/6; Srivastava, 
1996). These initiatives generally increased the freedom of incumbent firms to expand.  
Encouragement of de-novo entry was less effective. 
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The second phase of reforms, which was part of the substantial structural adjustment programme 
of 1991 under IMF injunctions, was more radical. New Industrial policy lifted the rules of 
investment licensing. Restrictions on expansion by monopoly houses were relaxed, rules of 
foreign investment relaxed, and sectors reserved for the public sector were thrown open to 
private sector entry and competition.
2
 Trade liberalisation was just as significant. Procedures for 
foreign direct investment were simplified and trade tariffs reduced. The maximum import tariff 
was reduced to 40 percent from a high of 340 percent. Quantitative restrictions were eliminated 
for capital and intermediate goods. The substantial thrust of 1991 reforms was to expose 
incumbent firms to greater competition, particularly international competition, but also from 
new entrants.  
 
The relative strengths of the reform episodes of the mid Eighties and the Nineties and the 
difference they created in terms of observed growth has been debated. Panagariya (2004) taking 
issue with deLong (2001) concludes that the former were “limited in scope and without a clear 
roadmap”, but they laid the basis for the reforms in the 1990s which were “more systematic and 
systemic”. 
 
2.2 Literature  
 
Most studies of changes in market concentration fall into the traditional industrial organisation 
(IO) framework, wherein changes in market concentration are seen as determined by a number 
of other industry-level behaviour and performance variables. In this paper, we deviate from this 
literature by decomposing the changes in market concentration into 2 components and by also 
considering the factors that influence each of these components. As indicated earlier, this derives 
much from Davies and Geroski (1997) who decompose the concentration ratio into the sum of 
market share changes and net entry. We will return to this in the next section. 
 
In terms of changes in industry, the somewhat hesitant mid 1980s liberalisation has not come 
under much scrutiny, followed as it was by the radical 1991 reforms.
3
 Srivastava (1996) and 
Chand and Sen (2002), both focus on productivity: firms increased their use of imported raw 
materials, and labour productivity and capital intensity increased. Srivastava reports clear 
evidence of reallocation of resources at the sectoral level
4
; Chand and Sen find significant 
increase in total factor productivity growth.  
 
Basant (2000) provides an analytical narrative of corporate responses to the reforms of 1991. 
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) offered significant competition to domestic incumbents, 
engaging in mergers and acquisitions to enter Indian markets. In response, domestic firms have 
been vigorous in attempts to restructure and consolidate in chosen areas.  Domestic firms clearly 
needed to improve organisational and technical efficiencies to survive, while MNEs needed to 
invest in building local distribution networks (Patibandla, 2002).  Chandra and Sastry (1998) 
report the results of a survey that found firms making significant attempts to upgrade 
manufacturing capability.  More firms have come to rely on imported technology, and a larger 
number of firms have embarked on export based growth paths.  
 
Ghemawat and Khanna (1998) report on two case studies of the responses of diversified Indian 
business groups to the reforms of 1991. With the sudden increase in competitive intensity their 
chosen subject business groups undertook tremendous restructuring, involving staged re-
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focussing of business portfolios using a variety of partial and complete exit and entry options.  
One of the important pointers for large sample work on corporate responses to liberalisation 
identified by their case studies is the need to allow for lags in the process showing results.  
 
Close in spirit to the current study is the work of Ghemawat and Kennedy (1998) who examined 
the impact of sudden and simultaneous liberalisation in Poland along many fronts (the "big 
bang" of 1 January, 1990, encompassing foreign trade, FDI, prices, and regulations on entry, exit 
and factor markets) on market structure. They highlighted the disequilibrium dynamics and the 
need to note distortions in pre-shock structure and the lags in adjustment to new equilibrium 
after the sudden increase in the role of market forces. Drawing on Sutton (1991, 1998) they 
explained the deconcentration of many markets after competitive shocks in terms of adjustment 
from an initial disequilibrium to new equilibrium levels that (given high levels of initial 
concentration) were lower. Sutton's bounds approach also suggests that the adjustment will 
depend on the structural attributes of the industry: the lowest sustainable levels of concentration 
will increase with advertising, R&D and asset intensity. 
 
3.  Market Structure Dynamics: Growth and Turbulence 
 
3.1 Concentration, Mean Reversion and Mobility: A decomposition scheme 
 
The Demsetzian hypothesis that the growth and performance of efficient firms is the 
proximate cause of increases in market concentration could be extended to the context of 
liberalisation: efficient firms may grow faster under liberalisation, particularly in industries 
characterised by economies of scale wherein this growth will further increase efficiency. The 
implication is that industries marked by economies of scale will see higher levels of 
concentration relative to those without economies of scale.  Patibandla (1998) argues that 
small and medium scale firms were found to be more efficient than large firms in the pre 
reforms period with their growth being constrained only by capital market imperfections and 
market transaction costs. These imposed imposed mobility and entry barriers on these firms.  
Extending his analysis, we argue that if reforms did reduce capital market imperfections, we 
might expect efficient small firms to have increasingly contested the market positions of 
inefficient large firms and to have grown on the strength of their higher production 
efficiency. On the other hand, if small firms faced greater difficulty in obtaining external 
finance, as some have argued with the share of bank credit to small firms (categorized as 
small scale industry), having actually declined (Rao, 2005), then liberalization may not have 
reduced capital market imperfections faced by small firms. The net effect is uncertain. If 
efficient small firms grow, then the size distribution will grow more equal in the short run.  
 
 
However, the structural shock of liberalisation has been accompanied by the inevitable myriad 
of random shocks in the market environment - firm specific, industry wide or economy wide.  
Observed patterns in the evolution of market shares will reflect firm reactions to random shocks 
as well as structural shocks.  What would be useful is a framework that pins down the joint 
evolution of market share turbulence and size-related growth.  This would address the 
`disjunction’ noted by Davies and Geroski (1997) " . . . between studies of . . . industrial 
concentration and the studies of market shares of individual firms . . . Even the obvious link, via 
aggregation of market shares . . . has been insufficiently explored".   
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Full distribution measures of concentration permit simple exact decompositions of concentration 
change into components that relate to turbulence and size related growth. Consider a set of firms 
in a cross section, indexed by i, and the variable of interest, firm size denoted by s. For 
individual i, change in size over time is by definition, ititit sss ∆+≡ −1 . If market concentration, 
the cross section distributional feature of interest is measured by the real valued function of the 
vector of market shares, say f(st), then )()( t1tt sss ∆+≡ −ff . If the statistical function f(.) is 
additive in the sense that it can be written: ),()()()( ttt1tt sssss ∆+∆+= − gfff  the cross 
sectional feature measured by f(.) increases with )( ts∆f , a summary measure of all changes of 
market shares, and ),( tt ss ∆g , a summary measure of  the systematic relationship between 
current market shares and changes in market shares. 
 
In this paper we work with the Hirschman-Herfindal index. The HHI has the advantage in 
common with other full distribution measures of concentration, of reflecting both the size 
inequality and firm numbers in the industry. It is one of the most commonly used measures 
and is therefore well understood.  If the size share of firm i, is represented by sit, and the 
vector of market shares is st, then HHI at time t is defined as  H(st) = Σi(sit)2 . HHI at time t 
is:
5
   
 
∑∑ ∆+∆+= −−
i
itit
i
ittt sssHHIHHI 1
2
1 2  (1) 
 
The third term in the RHS of (1) is a measure of the linear association between initial market 
share and change in market share. This term (SGRT) weights the change in market share of each 
firm with its starting market share. Thus it gives greater weight to market share changes of large 
firms. This term captures the hypothesis commonly presented as Gibrat’s Law, and which has 
been reviewed in detail in Sutton (1997). If the size-growth term is significant, then of course 
growth is related to size and therefore Gibrat’s Law is rejected. If it is not significant, then we 
can argue that Gibrat’s Law holds. A negative SGRT will imply that small firms have, on 
average, gained relative to large.
6
 
 
The second term in the RHS of (1), ∑ ∆
2
iti s , is a measure of market share turbulence, or 
mobility, (MOB) (Cable, 1997). MOB is a measure of gross change in market shares, and 
picks up both increases and decreases in market shares. 
7
  This concept of mobility differs 
from the notion that Sutton(1997) describes as turbulence.  
 
Therefore:   
 
SGRTMOBH t +≡∆ )(s .  (2) 
 
This identity decomposes the change in concentration into a systematic size related growth 
component, and another, total intra-distributional mobility component. This decomposition a 
novel one, though it does derive from similar ones in Cable (1997) and Davies and Geroski 
(1997). The Davies and Geroski decomposition was itself derived from Weiss (1965) where 
the concentration measure being decomposed is the concentration ratio and seen as composed 
of the sum of market share changes of surviving firms (SUR), the joint market shares of 
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entrants into the top 5 in year t+1 (ENT) minus the joint market shares of exitors out of the 
top 5 in year t+1 (EXT). 
 
 
3.2 Conjectures on market structure dynamics  
 
In a liberalised environment, the market selection process should, in course of time, highlight 
any systematic differentials in the abilities of firms to pick up and leverage market opportunities 
while withstanding competition. If the capable firms are the small ones, we would expect that 
market share movement takes the form of small firms gaining share relative to large, and 
therefore a reduction in concentration. If the efficient firms were the large ones we would expect 
large firms to increase their market shares, and increased concentration. The overall argument 
implies that technological economies of scale determine the long run market concentration. 
 
But models of market structure highlight the way firm behaviour (“conduct”) in pursuit of 
market power successfully maintains concentration at high levels. By increasing firm choice 
liberalisation reinforces the role of firm level efforts (to enter, to prevent entry, and to compete 
with others in the market).  The corollary is that attained market shares are under fiercer 
challenge, and competitive shocks may increase the volatility in market shares. Increase in 
mobility ipso-facto, increases concentration,
8
 and since turbulence is an indicator of competitive 
rivalry, increase in concentration is not a negative development. Increases or decreases in 
concentration only carry information on whether, on balance, small firms or large are winning in 
the market.  
 
The immediate response of potential entrants and incumbents to a relaxation of constraints could 
be increased investment, employment, R&D, import or export activity, in various combinations. 
The heightened tempo of competitive activity might translate into an initial phase of increased 
turbulence in market shares, which should cloud around the underlying systematic adjustment 
process of industries moving from (relatively stable) pre-liberalisation market concentration 
levels, to equilibrium market structures in the new environment.  The pre-liberalisation 
configuration was relatively stable, and has been characterised as a disequilibrium, based as it 
was on a pervasive command and control system. For each industry, the speed of adjustment is 
likely to depend on the deviation of this pre-liberalisation concentration level from the 
post-liberalisation equilibrium.  
 
The implications of domestic liberalisation should be different from those of comprehensive 
liberalisation.  Till the mid 1980s, industrial, trade, public sector, foreign investment and foreign 
exchange policies constrained and protected firms from internal and external competition, and 
directed their efforts towards rent seeking and lobbying. Small-scale sector policies prevented 
firms from reaching economies of scale in many sectors. In the new climate of domestic 
freedom created by the reforms of 1985-1986, incumbent firms would have been at an 
advantage in gaining market shares. If firms had been held back from the scales of the best 
practise technology, one might have expected them to grow. In industries where advertising and 
R&D are natural instruments of vertical product differentiation, large firms may have the 
relative advantage and firm level "escalation" of endogenous sunk cost investments could have 
led to increases in market concentration.  
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There has been significant new entry in Indian industry after the 1991 liberalistion, particularly 
MNCs with superior technologies compared local firms (Patibandla, 2002). When foreign firms 
gained substantial access to the domestic market in 1991, large Indian firms clearly began 
paying more attention to upgrading capabilities, and product differentiation through increased 
advertising, R&D and marketing expenditures, but it is not clear that these efforts were sufficient 
to meet the competitive challenge (Basant and Chandra, 2002). Sutton's model (1991,1998) 
predicts that the resulting equilibrium after a sudden and sharp increase in the toughness of 
competition could be an increase in concentration after a shake out of the laggards in 
restructuring. The dataset available to us includes entrants and MNC firms but does not allow 
the analysis of their separate effects (see section 4).  
 
In summary, liberalisation can lead to interesting patterns in the dynamics of two components of 
market structure. In each industry, the market share volatility will cloud the structurally based, 
systematic growth response of firms, small and large, that depends on the advantage or 
disadvantage of size in the new competitive milieu. To understand the change in market 
structure we need to disentangle the contribution of the size related growth component from that 
of the market share volatility component, and assess their separate dynamics. 
 
4. Data  
 
The data used in this paper is the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) compilation of firm level profit 
and loss accounts and balance sheets of the large and medium, non-government, non-financial, 
public limited companies registered in India. The data relate to individual companies, which 
may be parts of much larger industrial houses, but are legally separate entities, independent in 
their day-to-day operations. These companies fall in 83 three-digit industries. The assignment is 
based on majority (> 50%) output
9
.  We use data for the period 1980-1998.  
 
The RBI data comes from a purposive sample designed to adequately represent companies 
belonging to different industry groups and size classes. The sample size is relatively large 
both in terms of numbers (and in terms of paid-up capital - accounting for nearly 65% of the 
total paid-up capital of the entire population of public limited companies). On average there 
were 23 firms per industry per year, ranging from a maximum of 132 firms, to a minimum of 
a single firm. The size of the sample in terms of number of companies has been increasing 
over the years, and over 75% of companies are retained from one year to the next
10
.   
 
Firms however can fall out of this panel for a couple of reasons.  They may not be sampled; 
they may fail to meet the size requirements; third, they may fail to submit their returns to the 
RBI. In an analogous manner, when firms enter the dataset, they may not reflect new entry.  
Thus they may be: firms that have just reached the size threshold; firms that fell out because 
they did not submit their returns and are now doing so. Given this, it is not possible to 
distinguish "births'' and  "deaths'' from the changing sample composition. This is one clear 
limitation of the data available
11
 and must be taken into account in interpreting our results.  
Likewise, RBI data includes firms that are foreign owned, and entrant MNCs  but they are not 
separately identified. Thus while MNCs and new entrants are not excluded from our analysis,  
we are unable to delineate their separate effects. Another limitation of the data is that it is 
restricted to large/medium firms, a restriction that could cause the HHI to be biased upward.  
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For the purposes of computing the indices of concentration, size-growth and mobility, we 
constituted two-year rolling panels of firms from the data.  For each of the industry specific 
explanatory variables, we computed annual median values across all firms in the industry from 
the first years of the rolling panels - the means were affected by outliers. The panel of median 
values constitutes our data on explanatory variables. 
 
The table A1 in the Appendix presents the summary statistics for the variables of interest in the 
pre-liberalisation and post-liberalisation periods. Even in terms of the means across years and 
industries (within the pre and post-liberalisation periods), the proportionate changes in the size-
growth component (SGRT) and the mobility (MOB) component are high relative to the change 
in concentration (HHI). For variables (the reported values are means over the years and across 
industries, of the year-industry median firm values) such exports, advertising and R&D as ratios 
to sales, as well as growth rates and profitability that capture forces that drive market structure, 
the domestic liberalisation period saw sharper increases relative to the pre-liberalisation period, 
followed by a some declines in the post-1991 period. 
 
Our focus in this paper is on understanding real economic processes that underlie changes in 
market concentration, and on assessing their relative magnitudes in domestic as against 
comprehensive liberalisation. It must be re-iterated that the data does not permit us to estimate 
true levels of market concentration; the purposive sampling frame is designed to provide 
coverage only of large and medium firms. This data set is the most comprehensive one spanning 
the period of interest; the selective coverage does mean that the results we report are specific to 
this population.  
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Figure 1 above uses data on the printing industry alone to illustrate the way in which the 
underlying processes, (the way growth is related to size, and market share turbulence) responded 
to the different liberalisation episodes. When liberalisation was partial and domestic, mobility 
(MOB) shot up and small firms grew relative to large, leading to a reduction in the size-growth 
component (SGRT).  In the comprehensive liberalisation episode, again this was repeated. In 
both cases they tended to offset each other, leading to lower visible change in market structure 
itself. 
 
The tendency of the components to offset each other is illustrated in figure 2. Here we have 
plotted all industry-year data points for SGRT, MOB and ∆HHI, ordered descending according 
to ∆HHI, irrespective of industry or year. The scatters are summarised by simple polynomial 
trend plots.  It is obvious that the underlying processes offset each other and in the majority of 
cases, produce changes in market structure that are much smaller than the components 
themselves.  
 
 
5. Estimation  
 
Capital intensity, advertising and R&D intensity have been identified as significant determinants 
of market structure in many empirical IO studies. In addition, the rate of growth of the market 
and export propensity have also been seen to matter. The standard method of explaining market 
structure would be to estimate a model for concentration including the above as explanatory 
variables. In this paper, we depart from this, by explicitly modelling the change in concentration 
as being composed of two processes - size related growth and market share mobility.  We then 
model the determinants of each of these components, together with the determinants of 
concentration, to see if the former adds to our understanding of why (and how) concentration 
changes.  
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Our modelling strategy is based on the identity:  
 
 )()()( ,1,1,1 tttttt SGRTMOBH −−− +≡∆ sss .     (3) 
 
The economic and technological drivers mentioned above (capital intensity, advertising, R&D, 
growth and exports) can then be seen as affecting concentration through their effects on market 
share mobility on the one hand and size-related growth on the other.
12
 The explanatory variables 
in our econometric model fall into three classes: the standard IO variables, the variables 
reflecting dynamics and variables reflecting endogenous sunk costs. 
 
5.1 The Standard Model  
 
Traditional SCP models recognise structural, behavioural and performance-related drivers of 
market structure, which work either at the firm, or the industry, level. Our standard model 
includes: 
 
KSR: The capital-sales ratio represents exogenous sunk costs through the capital intensity 
of the industry. In general, one might expect that in a high KSR industry, advantage 
falls to larger firms, increasing SGRT. 
 
PROFIT:  The return on sales measures profitability, which is both determined by market 
structure and, in turn, determines market structure
13
. An industry with above 
average PFT can be expected to encourage the entry and growth of smaller firms 
increasing MOB and decreasing SGRT.  
 
EXPSR:   The ratio of exports to sales, can feed back to domestic market shares, through 
learning and good practice, as well as through scale of operation.  Typically, the 
smaller (of the large and medium) firms should be better placed to benefit in terms 
of leveraging exports to gain domestic market shares. 
 
GROWTH: Growth of market size is measured as change in industry output between two years. 
In growing markets incumbents may find it difficult to occupy all the niches. New 
entry might be faster, and MOB greater. The effect on concentration will depend 
upon how agile small firms are in filling the niches that arise.  
 
ASR: Industrial Organisation (IO) studies generally expect that brand loyalties will be 
reinforced by pre-emptive advertising campaigns, which in turn reinforce the 
existing monopolistic positions. From the point of view of our analysis in this paper, 
however, this would imply that there would be relatively little volatility and large 
firms may gain further, increasing SGRT.   
 
The explanatory variables are annual median values across all firms in the industry for the 
year. It is worth making a methodological point. The endogeneity of the independent 
variables is a potential problem in most models involving firm behaviour and performance 
and has been well-recognised in the industrial organisation literature. This is true of the 
models in this paper too. Thus, while profitability may influence entry into an industry, this 
entry will in turn influence market shares of the firms and therefore will influence 
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profitability. The same would be true of advertising and exports too. In this paper, we 
recognize this problem by lagging our right hand side variables as a number of other authors 
have done (Driffield and Kambhampati, 2003; Kambhampati and Parikh, 2004). Thus, while 
past profitability would influence current market structure (because it takes time for firms to 
respond to excess profits and enter the industry), the other relationship i.e. from market 
shares to profitability is a contemporaneous one i.e. current market share will influence 
current profits. This is true for a number of variables in the Structure-profits relationship and 
we have therefore lagged exports, advertising and R&D. 
 
 
5.2 Dynamics 
 
As indicated earlier, one of the major drivers of structural change during this period was the 
liberalisation that was undertaken in the mid-1980s and then later in the early 1990s. This 
liberalisation may be expected to have a direct impact on market structure via entry into and exit 
from the industry. However, it may also have an impact by changing the way in which firms 
deploy certain behavioural expenditures (like advertising and R&D) or take advantage of 
exports markets. To take the former into account, we include two dummy variables (D86 and 
D91) into our models. To take the latter into account, we allow these dummy variables to 
interact with each of our other behavioural variables (to see how, if at all, they change after the 
liberalisation). Thus, we have: 
 
D86: which is a dummy variable and is =0 before 1986 and =1 for the years including and 
following 1986, marking out the domestic liberalisation. 
D91: marks out the comprehensive liberalisation in 1991 and is a dummy variable =0 before 
1991 and is =1 for the years including and following 1991. 
 
We also include D86 and D91 interacted with standard model variables (D86*ASR, 
D86*RDSR, D86*PROFIT and so on), to capture variations in the impacts of these variables 
after each of the liberalisation episodes. 
 
In addition to these variables that attempt to capture the impact of liberalisation, we also include 
two other dynamic variables – Trend and Lag – to capture other longer-term dynamic patterns 
(see Kambhampati and Parikh, 2005 for a similar dynamic analysis). Trend captures the long-
term trend and we also interact it with D86 and D91 to see if there are any changes or breaks in 
these trends following the two reforms periods. Finally, Lag attempts to control for 
autoregressive patterns in our variables. 
 
5.3 Endogenous Sunk Costs and Escalation  
 
Sutton (1991, 1998) has argued strongly that an increase in the toughness of competition 
prompts firms to competitively escalate (endogenous sunk cost) investment programmes, to 
move up the “quality” ladder.  One would expect that in industries where endogenous sunk costs 
(such as Advertising and R&D) are important, the essence of market selection will be that some 
firms will be more agile and effective in deploying these strategies than others. We should 
expect to see higher average values of advertising and R&D intensity, having a larger impact on 
market structure and its components. To test for this, we included, ASR and RDSRin addition to 
the the standard model variables,  
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RDSR:  R&D-sales ratio, capturing R&D intensity of the industry.
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ASR*D86 and ASR*D91:  to capture liberalisation induced trend shifts in the impact of 
advertising intensity. 
RDSR*D86 and RDSR*D91:  to capture liberalisation induced trend shifts in impacts of R&D 
intensity. 
 
It is worth mentioning that in exploratory work we attempted to capture the degree of escalation 
in these strategies in individual industries by including annual intra-industry dispersions of these 
variables – annual intra-industry inter-quartile ranges/variances of these variables. We found that 
these were not satisfactory proxies for the escalatory spread of strategy variable across firms 
within the industry, and dropped them from this final analysis. 
 
 
 
6. Results  
 
Our panel consists of data on 83 industries from 1980 to 1998. We estimate separate models 
for SGRT and MOB, and use these to understand changes in concentration, which is also 
separately analysed.  The data are a panel. and we estimate our model using both random and 
fixed effect methods. The Hausman test indicates that the fixed effects specification 
dominates the random effects in almost all cases. The time effects are clearly significant, and 
the models presented in Tables 1 and 2 are two-way error components models..  
 
In addition to the above, we estimate two versions of our model – the full model and the 
restricted dynamic model. The full model includes both the standard IO variables as well as the 
dynamic variables (Table 1).  The restricted dynamic model, on the other hand, includes only the 
dynamic variables and is presented in Table 2. The model is estimated because the standard IO 
variables were found to be of very limited significance in the full model. Estimating the 
restricted dynamic model separately (as a model nested within the full model) allows us to test 
this hypothesis formally using a likelihood ratio test. We find that the likelihood ratio test is 
rejected in all 3 equations (SGRT, MOB and HHI) leading us to conclude that the standard IO 
variables do contribute to the explanation. However, their contribution is limited, and this is 
clear when we compare the values predicted by the restricted dynamic model to that of the full 
model (Figure 4). We therefore present these estimates as well in Table 2 below. 
 
 
6.1 Model Estimates  
 
Among the standard drivers of market structure, industry profit margins (PROFIT) induced 
larger firms to grow relative to smaller firms, and at the same time, decreased market share 
volatility.  Advertising (ASR) benefited the growth of smaller firms, and increased market share 
volatility, while research and development (R&D) benefited the growth of larger firms and 
decreased mobility.  R&D appears to have been a more effective barrier to small firm growth in 
India than advertising.  
 
There were significant long-term trends in all three dependent variables - size-related growth, 
market share turbulence and in market concentration.  Over the whole period, the size growth 
relationship trended upwards, suggesting an overall tendency for the larger firms to grow faster 
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than the smaller, ceteris paribus.  Likewise, there was a decreasing trend in market share 
mobility.  This decline offsets the increase in size related growth in determining market 
concentration that shows a minuscule, but statistically significant, negative trend.  
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Table 1:  Full Model Estimation Results 
  HHI MOB SGRT 
Variable Coefficient   t-value Coefficient   t-value Coefficient  
  
t-value 
DEPVAR(L) 0.451 *** 18.78 -0.026   -0.87 -0.064 ** -2.07 
TREND -0.007 ** -2.31 -0.027 *** -3.84 0.033 *** 4.124 
GROWTH 0.001   0.542 -0.001   -0.17 0   0.017 
PROFIT(L) -0.062   -1.52 -0.192 ** -2 0.285 ** 2.579 
KSR -0.005   -0.49 0.004   0.161 0.011   0.42 
EXPSR(L) 0.014   0.103 0.153   0.477 -0.068   -0.18 
ASR(L) 0.02 * 1.79 0.089 ** 3.329 -0.097 *** -3.16 
RDSR(L) -0.343 ** -2.7 -0.651 ** -2.19 0.977 ** 2.851 
D86 0.074 * 1.665 -0.19 * -1.82 0.111   0.924 
TREND*D86 -0.004   -0.71 0.035 ** 2.878 -0.031 ** -2.24 
GRO*D86 -0.011   -1.33 -0.031 * -1.67 0.024   1.138 
PFT(L)*D86 -0.058   -1.38 0.045   0.457 0.065   0.576 
KSR*D86 0.01   0.971 -0.015   -0.66 -0.004   -0.13 
EXPSR(L)*D86 -0.125   -0.87 -0.323   -0.96 0.309   0.795 
ASR(L)*D86 0.001   0.049 -0.078 ** -2.11 0.07 * 1.649 
RDSR(L)*D86 0.311   0.959 -0.987   -1.31 1.36   1.566 
D91 -0.112 ** -2.28 0.338 ** 2.961 -0.226 * -1.72 
TREND*D91 0.011 ** 2.401 -0.024 ** -2.22 0.014   1.147 
GROWTH*D91 0.008   1.092 0.035 * 1.967 -0.027   -1.33 
PROFIT(L)*D91 0.056   1.541 -0.094   -1.1 0.003   0.026 
KSR*D91 -0.013   -1.18 0   0.018 0.007   0.232 
EXPSR(L)*D91 0.004   0.05 0.051   0.25 -0.105   -0.44 
ASR(L)*D91 0.012   0.884 -0.015   -0.46 0.014   0.378 
RDSR(L)*D91 0.007   0.022 1.808 ** 2.334 -2.513 ** -2.82 
Log L 1227.4     347.5     163.4     
Chi-Sq (b=0) 2372.7    412.2    359.3     
Hausman  259.0    114.2    113.1     
R2 0.84    0.27    0.24     
Adj R2 0.83    0.21    0.17     
F 275.0     4.1     3.5     
 
Note: (L) indicates that the variables are lagged once.  
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Table 2:  Restricted Model Estimation Results 
  HHI MOB SGRT 
Variable Coefficient   t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value 
DEPVAR(L) 0.457 *** 19.12 -0.02   -0.69 -0.053 * -1.8 
TREND -0.006 ** -2.08 -0.026 ** -3.7 0.031 ** 3.9 
D86 0.049   1.125 -0.214 ** -2.15 0.187   1.625 
TREND*D86 -0.002   -0.46 0.034 ** 2.874 -0.034 ** -2.49 
D91 -0.081 ** -1.66 0.326 ** 2.929 -0.277 ** -2.15 
TREND*D91 0.009 ** 1.922 -0.024 ** -2.3 0.019   1.581 
Log L 1411.0     325.1     135.2     
Chi-Sq (b=0) 2739.4     367.5     302.9     
Hausman  245.3     106.7     101.6     
R2 0.88     0.25     0.21     
Adj R2 0.87     0.19     0.15     
F 96.4     4.4     3.5     
 
 
The 1985 liberalisation (D86*TREND) reversed the trend in size-related growth, suggesting that 
smaller firms gained in this period.  This was accompanied by a step up in the level of market share 
turbulence.  The 1991 liberalisation seemed to have had no significant impact on size-related 
growth, but it influenced the level of mobility. MOB stepped up in 1991 (positive D91) and from 
this high point, declined in trend. Growth in market size also had a significant positive impact on 
MOB after 1991. It is of course possible that size related growth (SGRT) could be independent of 
market shares, because with growth of market size in the new environment, in principle, any firm 
could have grown - liberalisation accommodates growth of all firms.  In this context, firms that are 
quick off the mark will be the ones that are “able” to grow in this new liberalised but competitive 
climate. We therefore did not presuppose any particular sign for SGRT. 
 
It is notable that neither of the liberalisation episodes led to any significant change in the impact of 
profit margins, capital use, advertising, or exports on market structure or its components. Amongst 
behavioural variables, only R&D has a significant differential in the second liberalisation episode.  
Although the R&D intensity benefited large firms (see above), after the 1991 liberalisation, its impact 
shifted in favour of smaller firms, increasing mobility as well.  
 
Since our estimations indicate that the dynamic variables (lags, trend and liberalisation dummies) were 
by far the most significant variables in these models, we re-estimated the models including only the 
dynamic variables (see Restricted Dynamic Model in Table 2). The likelihood ratio test of the 
unrestricted against the restricted model shows the restrictions to be significant. However, we present 
these results because our simulations indicate that in the presence of significant structural changes, the 
contribution of standard IO variables to the explanation of market structure diminishes and the role of 
dynamic changes becomes more significant. This, of course, is not surprising, given that most IO 
models assume mature economies with stable (if not equilibrium) market structures. In spite of this 
result, we present the models both with and without the structural variables. The former is the standard 
IO model and it is interesting to see what impact these variables have in a dynamic, fast changing 
economy like India. The latter has only the time- and reform related variables. We tried to maintain the 
same specification for all 3 models because we – prima facie- expect similar driving forces to be active 
in working upon these structural aspects industry. 
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6.2. Implications of results 
 
To secure an overall picture we present the annual conditional mean values predicted by the models in 
Table 1.  Figure 3 presents predicted values of SGRT and MOB, and compares them with the change 
in HHI that arises from these predictions.  SGRT and MOB on the other hand have very pronounced 
dynamic patterns, but they offset each other; as a result, annual changes in HHI are very small.    
 
 
 
An observer looking only at HHI and its change might have inferred that little of import happened with 
either episode of liberalisation. In fact, much did happen. Prior to 1985, larger firms were growing 
faster (SGRT was rising) and market share volatility (MOB) was in decline.  The changes in direction 
in SGRT and MOB were reversed in the domestic liberalisation phase - SGRT fell and MOB rose; 
suggesting that smaller firms were quicker to take up new opportunities in an environment that was 
partially protected.  These trends were reversed again in the comprehensive liberalisation phase, SGRT 
rose and MOB fell, suggesting that larger firms fared better than the smaller in the more competitive 
and turbulent environment of the 1990s 
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Figure 4 shows that restricted models including only the dynamics terms (LAG, TREND, D86, D91, 
D86*TREND, D91*TREND) decompose the mean tendencies of MOB and SGRT into constituents:  
the standard model and the dynamics.  In both cases, the dynamics has most of the explanatory power 
of the full model. The trends are captured almost entirely.    
 
7. Conclusions  
 
From the point of view of the literature on the determinants of market structure, we have sought to 
revisit the difference between concentration and turbulence as measures of competition.  The standard 
interpretation would lead us expect lower concentration with liberalisation, and increased market share 
churning. But increased turbulence, ipso-facto, increases concentration, and it is the change in 
size-growth relationship that drives a wedge between the two. If concentration declines while 
turbulence increases that will necessarily be because in the reallocation of market shares, agile smaller 
firms are the gainers.  The need to iron out capital market imperfections that hamper the growth of 
efficient small firms stands out as a conclusion. 
 
Two factors distinguish this paper from others in this field. First, we consider the determinants of 
market structure in terms of the determinants of its components – size-related growth and mobility. 
Figure 1 confirms the usefulness of this decomposition; in India both the size-growth relationship and 
market share mobility changed considerably in response to the two liberalisation episodes.  By virtue 
of their offsets, the net effect of liberalisation on concentration was small. Examining market structure 
changes alone would have led us to underestimate the impact of liberalisation on processes driving 
market structure. It also further strengthens the need for a change in methodology away from a 
consideration of market structure alone towards a consideration of the components of this change. 
 19 
Detailed knowledge of the patterns of movement of these decomposed variables should help to make 
industrial policy more focussed and relevant. 
 
The second relates to our findings rather than our methodology. Contrary to other papers in the field, 
we find that the dynamic variables (structural breaks, trends and lags) explain most of the changes in 
the components of market structure. This is not surprising, because the standard industrial organisation 
model relates to mature (and close to equilibrium) market structures, whereas the economies in 
transition in general (the Indian economy from the mid 1980s and 1990s) were arguably far from 
equilibrium. It is not surprising that structural changes that are absorbed into the dynamics of 
liberalisation turn out to explain much of the changes in market structure, dwarfing the effects of the 
limited set of observable driving variables considered in the model.   
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Appendices  
 
 
Table A1: Summary Statistics 
  Mean Standard deviation Skewness 
  1982-85 1986-90 1991-97 1982-85 1986-90 1991-97 1982-85 1986-90 1991-97 
HHI 0.269 0.287 0.279 0.226 0.240 0.235 1.638 1.372 1.441 
SGRT -0.088 -0.094 -0.078 0.279 0.244 0.236 -4.876 -3.985 -4.729 
MOB 0.083 0.098 0.078 0.259 0.221 0.214 4.979 3.926 4.840 
GROWTH 0.396 0.493 0.394 2.161 5.865 4.058 12.565 23.245 31.557 
PROFIT 0.306 0.331 0.314 0.163 0.161 0.178 0.923 1.324 -2.550 
KSR 0.703 0.700 0.765 0.591 0.569 1.528 3.628 7.472 23.462 
EXPSR 0.012 0.025 0.019 0.027 0.072 0.062 3.212 5.940 6.807 
ASR 0.187 0.264 0.216 0.473 0.716 0.573 3.894 6.439 6.583 
RDSR 0.008 0.031 0.016 0.043 0.080 0.059 6.007 3.750 5.168 
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Table A2: List of Industries 
Code Industry Name Code Industry Name Code Industry Name 
110 Tea Plantations 420 Aluminium 470 Matches 
120 Coffee Plantations 430 Other non-ferrous metals (Basic) 490 Miscellaneous 
130 Rubber Plantations 441 Automobile - vehicles 510 Mineral oils 
190 Misc.  Plantations 442 Automobile - Components etc.. 521 Cement (hydraulic) 
210 coal mining 443 Railway equipments 522 Asbestos & As. Cement prods 
220 Metal  Mining 444 Other Transport equipments 531 Structural clay products 
230 Petroleum Mining 445 Cables 532 Pottery,china & earthenware  
290 Other Mining 446 Dry Cells 541 Tyres and tubes 
310 Grains & Pulses 447 Electric Lamps 542 Other rubber products 
320 Edible oils 448 Other Electrical Machinery 551 Paper 
331 Sugar 449 Machine Tools 552 Products of pulp & board 
332 Other food products 450 Textile Machinery and parts 553 Wood products and furniture 
341 Cigarette 451 Misc. Mechinery 561 Glass containers 
342 Other tobacco  452 Steel tubes & pipes 562 Other Glass products 
351 Cotton Textiles - Spg. 453 Steel Wire ropes 571 Printing 
352 Cotton Textiles - Wvg. 454 Steel Forgings 572 Publishing 
353 Cotton Textiles - Comp 455 Foundries and Engg. Workshops 573 Printing, Publishing etc. 
354 Cotton Textiles - Others 456 Aluminium Ware 580 Plastic products 
355 Jute Textiles 457 Other Ferrous / non-ferrous metal  589 Diversified 
356 Silk & Rayon Textiles - Spinning. 461 Chemical Fertilisers 590 Miscellaneous 
357 Silk & Rayon Textiles - Weaving. 462 Dyes & Dyestuff 610 Construction 
358 Silk & Rayon Textiles - Composites 463 Man made fibres 620 Electricity generation and supply 
359 Woolen Textiles 464 Plastic Raw materials 640 Trading 
360 Ginning, pressing  465 Other basic industrial chemicals 650 Land & Estate 
370 Breweries & Distilleries 466 Medicines & Pharma. preps 660 Road Transport 
380 Leather & Leather products 467 Paints, Varnishes etc. 670 Shipping 
390 Miscellaneous 468 Other chemical products 680 Hotels, restaurants 
410 Iron & Steel 469 Industrial & medical gases 690 Miscellaneous 
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Notes 
 
1
  They used a framework that integrated market concentration and market share turbulence to 
determine which of the two stylised facts captured the true picture of competitive rivalry. 
For the UK they analysed how the dynamics of market shares of largest firms feed into the 
concentration ratio (C5).  
 
2
  However, reservations for small-scale industry continued. While the government also accepted 
the need for redundancies, and began a process of withdrawal from involvement in 
employer-employee negotiations, few significant steps have been taken towards the removing 
exit barriers. 
 
3
  There has been considerable work on the growth results of reforms –  Joshi and Little 
(1994), Ahluwalia (2002), Srinivasan and Tendulkar (2003) and Desai (1990).  
 
4
  Away from metal based and heavy machinery sectors towards electrical machinery, chemicals, 
non-metallic mineral products and products such as leather, rubber, plastics and petroleum 
products. 
 
5
  Entry and Exit can be accommodated by letting sit-1 or sit as appropriate, to be  0. 
 
6
  SGRT can be written in terms of the β coefficient of a cross-sectional mean reversion equation.  
Consider a linear cross sectional relationship iiti ss εβα ++=∆ −1 . (This is the Galtonian 
regression model - in terms of market shares rather than log size.  If the distribution of its is 
skewed, the estimation results would be dominated by the largest firms.  In our context, with 
the focus on public companies, the distribution is less skewed than the case with all firms.) 
Such a regression provides an estimate of the degree of "mean reversion" (or converse) as the 
cross section evolves. The sign and magnitude of  βˆ  tells us whether firm sizes are reverting to 
mean size, or whether larger firms are growing larger.  Since the OLS estimate  
)(/),(ˆ 11 −− ∆= itiit sVssCovβ  the last term in the RHS can be rewritten in terms of the mean 
reversion coefficient, as: )()()(ˆ2 11 iitit sEsnEsV ∆+ −−β .  Alternative ways in which this term 
can be written are: )(/1)(ˆ2 1
2 sHnsit −+−σβ , and )(/1)()( 1 sHnss itit −+−σσρ   where  ρ  
is the correlation coefficient between market shares at date t-1 and date t.  
 
7
  As MOB includes all market share changes,  this includes both (a) the case of large firms 
further increasing their market shares (regression away from the mean) as well as (b) the 
case of small firms increasing their market shares, which sometimes carries the specific 
connotation of mobility.    
 
8
  It is easy to see that concentration, proxied Variance of market shares can increase even 
when small firms grow faster, β < 1, if )( itV ε  offsets the tendency :  
)()()( 1
2
ititit VsVsV εβ += − .    
 
9
  The data set provides no information on the variety of products produced by a firm or on 
coverage ratios. Earlier studies (Shanker, 1988; Siddharthan, 1981) have indicated that 
firms in India tend to diversify narrowly (within the same 3 digit industry category) though 
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industry houses span wider industries. Government licensing also played a role in 
maintaining such a narrow range of diversification. Given this, it looks likely that, though 
firms may produce a number of different products, these products are likely to fall within 
the same industry group. 
 
10
  For example, the combined balance sheet analysis based on the data published by the RBI in 
1993 (Bulletin, December) reported results for 1988-89, 1989-90, and 1990-91 based on a 
sample of 2131 companies. A similar analysis in 1992 (Bulletin, November) reported results 
for 1908 companies for 1987-88, 1988-89 and 1989-90. The two samples had 1647 
companies in common. 
 
11
  There is the implicit assumption that the method by which successive samples are selected 
should not have undergone a change. For further details on the extent of coverage for each 
sample survey ref. Uma Datta Roy Chaudhari (1992)  pp. 599, 616 and 643. 
 
12
  An alternative method, one we do not pursue here would be to estimate a system of equations 
imposing the identity as a restriction. 
 
13
  This two-way causality is common to many variables included in IO studies. We take 
account of it here by lagging the variables, where appropriate. Thus, our model includes 
lagged values of PROFIT, ASR and RDSR, on the grounds that it would take time for entry 
(or a barrier to entry) to influence market structure. 
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